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Abstract
We consider the problem of noisy private information retrieval (NPIR) from N non-
communicating databases, each storing the same set of M messages. In this model, the
answer strings are not returned through noiseless bit pipes, but rather through noisy
memoryless channels. We aim at characterizing the PIR capacity for this model as a
function of the statistical information measures of the noisy channels such as entropy
and mutual information. We derive a general upper bound for the retrieval rate in the
form of a max-min optimization. We use the achievable schemes for the PIR problem
under asymmetric traffic constraints and random coding arguments to derive a general
lower bound for the retrieval rate. The upper and lower bounds match for M = 2
and M = 3, for any N , and any noisy channel. The results imply that separation
between channel coding and retrieval is optimal except for adapting the traffic ratio
from the databases. We refer to this as almost separation. Next, we consider the
private information retrieval problem from multiple access channels (MAC-PIR). In
MAC-PIR, the database responses reach the user through a multiple access channel
(MAC) that mixes the responses together in a stochastic way. We show that for the
additive MAC and the conjunction/disjunction MAC, channel coding and retrieval
scheme are inseparable unlike in NPIR. We show that the retrieval scheme depends
on the properties of the MAC, in particular on the linearity aspect. For both cases,
we provide schemes that achieve the full capacity without any loss due to the privacy
constraint, which implies that the user can exploit the nature of the channel to improve
privacy. Finally, we show that the full unconstrained capacity is not always attainable
by determining the capacity of the selection channel.
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CNS 13-14733, CCF 14-22111, CNS 15-26608 and CCF 17-
13977.
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1 Introduction
In the era of big data, efficient data-mining techniques are present everywhere, from social
media to online-shopping and search history. These new challenges motivate studying the
privacy issues that arise in modern networks. Private information retrieval (PIR), introduced
by Chor et al. [1] and remained an important research avenue in computer science community
(see for example [1–5]), is a canonical problem to study the privacy of the downloaded content
from public databases. In the classical PIR, a user wishes to retrieve a file privately from
N distributed and non-colluding databases each storing the same set of M messages (files),
in a way that no database can learn the identity of the user’s desired file. To that end, the
user submits queries for the databases that do not reveal the user’s interest in the desired
file. The databases respond with correct answer strings via noiseless orthogonal links, from
which the user reconstructs the desired file. PIR schemes are designed to be more efficient
than the trivial scheme of downloading all the files stored in the databases in terms of the
retrieval rate, which is defined as the ratio between the number of downloaded bits from the
desired message and the total download.
Recently, the PIR problem has attracted a renewed interest within the information theory
community [6–10]. In order to characterize the fundamental limits of the problem, Sun-Jafar
introduced the notion of PIR capacity CPIR in [11], which is defined as the supremum of
all PIR rates over all achievable retrieval schemes. [11] proved that for the classical PIR
model, CPIR = (1 +
1
N
+ · · · + 1
NM−1
)−1. The achievability scheme is a greedy algorithm
that employs a symmetric query structure for all databases. Following [11], the capacities of
many interesting variants of the classical PIR problem have been considered [12–43].
In all previous works, the links from the databases to the user are assumed to be noise-
less. Furthermore, these works assume that the answer strings are returned via orthogonal
links, i.e., the user receives N separate answer strings, which are not mixed. There are many
practical settings where these assumptions may not be valid. For instance, while brows-
ing (retrieving information on) the internet, some packets may be dropped randomly. This
scenario can be abstracted out as passing the answer strings through an erasure channel. Al-
ternatively, the data packets may be randomly corrupted, which can be modeled as a binary
symmetric channel that flips randomly some symbols in the answer strings. Consequently,
a more realistic realistic retrieval model may be to assume that the databases return their
answer strings through memoryless noisy channels with known transition probabilities. The
noisy nature of the channel induces random errors along the received answer strings.
Yet, in other applications, the answer strings may be mixed before reaching the user.
For example: if the user is retrieving the desired file from wireless base stations, the answer
strings would be combined on the air before reaching the user. Another example is retrieval
from a cloud, where the returned packets may collide and superimpose each other. These
practical settings can be represented with another abstract model, which is the cooperative
multiple access channel (MAC) model, where the databases cooperate to convey the desired
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message to the user, while the user receives a stochastic mapping from the database responses
in general. These two cases, namely, noisy and multiple access nature of retrieval channels,
pose many interesting questions, such as: How to devise schemes that mitigate the errors
introduced by the channel with a small sacrifice from the private retrieval rate? Is there a
separation between the channel coding needed for reliable transmission over noisy channels
and the private retrieval scheme, or if there is a necessity for joint processing? How do the
statistical properties of the noisy channels fundamentally affect the private retrieval rate?
In this paper, we introduce noisy PIR with orthogonal links (NPIR) and PIR problem
from multiple access channel (MAC-PIR). We first focus on the NPIR problem and then
consider the MAC-PIR problem in Section 6. In NPIR, the nth database is connected to
the user via a discrete memoryless channel with known transition probability distribution
p(yn|xn). Hence, the user needs to decode the desired message reliably by observing the
noisy versions of the returned answer strings. Intuitively, since a channel with worse channel
condition needs a lower code rate to combat the channel errors, we do not expect the lengths
of the answer strings to be the same from all the databases. Therefore, in this work, we allow
the traffic from each database to be asymmetric as in [38] and [39]. In this work, we aim
at characterizing the capacity of the NPIR problem in terms of the statistical information
measures of the noisy channels such as mutual information, the number of messages M ,
and the number of databases N . To that end, we first derive a general upper bound for
the retrieval rate in the form of a max-min problem. The converse proof is inspired by the
converse proof in [38], in particular in the way the asymmetry is handled. We show the
achievability proof by random coding arguments and enforcing the uncoded responses to
operate at one of the corner points of the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints.
The upper and lower bounds match for M = 2 and M = 3 messages, for arbitrary N
databases, and any noisy channel. Our results show that the channel coding needed to
mitigate the channel errors and the retrieval scheme are almost separable in the sense that
the noisy channels affect only the traffic ratio requested from each database and not the
explicit coding technique. Interestingly, the upper and lower bounds depend only on the
capacity of the noisy channels and not on the explicit transition probability of the channels.
In the MAC-PIR problem, the responses of the databases reach the user through a dis-
crete memoryless MAC with a known transition probability p(y|x1, · · · , xN ). In this case,
the output of the channel is a mixture (possibly noisy mixture) of all databases responses.
The user needs to decode the desired message with vanishingly small probability of error
from the output of the channel. Interestingly, for this model, we show that channel coding
and retrieval strategy are inseparable unlike in the NPIR problem. We show this fact by
deriving the PIR capacity of two simple MACs, namely: additive MAC, and logical conjunc-
tion/disjunction MAC. In these two cases, we show that privacy for free can be attained
by designing retrieval strategies that exploit the properties of the channel to maximize the
retrieval rate. Interestingly, we show that for the additive MAC, the optimal PIR scheme
3
is linear, while for the logical conjunction/disjunction MAC we show that a non-linear PIR
scheme, that requires N ≥ 2M−1 is needed to achieve CPIR = 1. We conclude this discussion
by showing that full unconstrained capacity may not be attainable for all MACs by giving a
counterexample, which is the selection MAC, which has a capacity of CPIR =
1
M
. The exact
PIR capacity of the MAC-PIR for an arbitrary transition probability distribution remains
an open problem in general.
2 System Model
We consider a classical PIR model with N replicated and non-communicating databases
storingM messages. Each database stores the same set of messages W1:M = {W1, · · · ,WM}.
The mth message Wm is an L-length binary (without loss of generality) vector picked uni-
formly from FL2 . The messages W1:M are independent and identically distributed, i.e.,
H(Wm) =L, m ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (1)
H(W1:M) =ML (2)
In PIR, a user wants to retrieve a message Wi reliably and privately. To that end, the
user submits N queries Q
[i]
1:N = {Q
[i]
1 , · · · , Q
[i]
N}, one for each database. Since the user does
not have any information about the message set in advance, the queries and the messages
are statistically independent,
I(W1:M ;Q
[i]
1:N) = 0, i ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (3)
The nth database responds to Q
[i]
n with a tn-length answer string A
[i]
n = (X
[i]
n,1, · · · , X
[i]
n,tn).
The nth answer string is a deterministic function of the messages W1:M and the query Q
[i]
n ,
hence,
H(A[i]n |W1:M , Q
[i]
n ) = 0, n ∈ {1, · · · , N}, i ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (4)
In noisy PIR with orthogonal links (NPIR, see Fig. 1), the user receives the nth answer
string via a discrete memoryless channel (response channel) with a transition probability
p(yn|xn). In this model, the noisy channels are orthogonal, in the sense that the noisy
answer strings do not interact (mix). Thus, the user receives a noisy answer string A˜
[i]
n =
(Y
[i]
n,1, · · · , Y
[i]
n,tn
). Therefore, we have,
P
(
A˜[i]n = (y
[i]
n,1, · · · , y
[i]
n,tn)|A
[i]
n = (x
[i]
n,1, · · · , x
[i]
n,tn)
)
=
tn∏
ηn=1
p
(
y[i]n,ηn|x
[i]
n,ηn
)
(5)
Consequently, (W1:M , Q
[i]
n ) → A
[i]
n → A˜
[i]
n forms a Markov chain. Let us denote the channel
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Figure 1: The noisy PIR (NPIR) problem.
capacity of the nth response channel by Cn, denote,
Cn = max
p(xn)
I(Xn; Yn) (6)
where Xn, Yn are the single-letter input and output pair for the nth response channel.
Without loss of generality, assume that the channel capacities are ordered such that C1 ≥
C2 ≥ · · · ≥ CN , i.e., the channel capacities form a non-increasing sequence. Let C =
(C1, · · · , CN) be the vector of the channel capacities.
We note that, in general, the user and the databases can agree on suitable lengths {tn}
N
n=1
for the answer strings, which may not be equal in general, such that they maximize the
retrieval rate. Let us define the traffic ratio vector τ = (τ1, · · · , τN) as,
τn =
tn∑N
j=1 tj
, n ∈ {1, · · · , N} (7)
To ensure privacy, the queries Q
[i]
1:N should be designed such that the query to the nth
database does not reveal any information about i. We can write the privacy constraint as
(Q[i]n , A
[i]
n ,W1:M) ∼ (Q
[j]
n , A
[j]
n ,W1:M), ∀i, j ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (8)
We note that from privacy constraint and due to the Markov chain (W1:M , Q
[i]
n )→ A
[i]
n → A˜
[i]
n ,
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we may write that (Q
[i]
n , A
[i]
n , A˜
[i]
n ,W1:M ,W1:M) ∼ (Q
[j]
n , A
[j]
n , A˜
[j]
n ,W1:M), ∀i, j ∈ {1, · · · ,M}.
In addition, the user should be able to reconstruct the desired message Wi by observing
the noisy answer strings A˜
[i]
1:N with arbitrarily small probability of error Pe(L), i.e., Pe(L)→ 0
as L→∞. Hence, from Fano’s inequality, we have,
H(Wi|Q
[i]
1:N , A˜
[i]
1:N) ≤ 1 + Pe(L) · L = o(L) (9)
where o(L)
L
→ 0 as L→∞.
For a fixed traffic ratio vector τ , the retrieval rate R(τ ,C) is achievable if there exists
a sequence of retrieval schemes, indexed by the message length L, that satisfy the privacy
constraint (8) and the reliability constraint (9) with answer string lengths {tn}
N
n=1 that
conform with (7), thus,
R(τ ,C) = lim
L→∞
L∑N
n=1 tn
(10)
Consequently, the retrieval rate R(C) is the supremum of R(τ ,C) over all traffic ratio
vectors in T = {(τ1, · · · , τN) : τn ≥ 0 ∀n,
∑N
n=1 τn = 1}. The PIR capacity for this model
CPIR(C) is given by
CPIR(C) = sup R(C) (11)
where the supermum is over all achievable retrieval schemes.
3 Main Results and Discussions on NPIR
In this section, we present the main results of the NPIR problem. The first result gives an
upper bound for the NPIR problem.
Theorem 1 (Upper bound) For NPIR with noisy links of capacities C = (C1, · · · , CN),
the retrieval rate is upper bounded by,
CPIR(C) ≤ C¯PIR(C) = max
τ∈T
min
ni∈{1,··· ,N}
∑N
n=1 τnCn +
∑N
n=n1+1
τnCn
n1
+ · · ·+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
τnCn
∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(12)
where T =
{
τ : τn ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ [1 : N ],
∑N
n=1 τn = 1
}
.
The proof of this upper bound is given in Section 4. The second result gives an achiev-
ability scheme for the NPIR problem.
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Theorem 2 (Lower bound) For NPIR with noisy links of capacities C = (C1, · · · , CN),
for a monotone non-decreasing sequence n = {ni}
M−1
i=0 ⊂ {1, · · · , N}
M , let n−1 = 0, and
S = {i ≥ 0 : ni − ni−1 > 0}. Denote yℓ[k] to be the number of stages of the achievable
scheme that downloads k-sums from the nth database in one repetition of the scheme, such
that nℓ−1 ≤ n ≤ nℓ, and ℓ ∈ S. Let ξℓ =
∏
s∈S\{ℓ}
(
M−2
s−1
)
. The number of stages yℓ[k] is
characterized by the following system of difference equations:
y0[k] = (n0−1)y0[k−1] +
∑
j∈S\{0}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1]
y1[k] = (n1−n0−1)y1[k−1] +
∑
j∈S\{1}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1]
yℓ[k] = n0ξℓδ[k−ℓ−1] + (nℓ−nℓ−1−1)yℓ[k − 1] +
∑
j∈S\{ℓ}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1], ℓ ≥ 2 (13)
where δ[·] is the Kronecker delta function. The initial conditions of (13) are y0[1] =∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
, and yj[k] = 0 for k ≤ j. Then, the achievable rate corresponding to n is
given by:
R(n,C) =
∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M−1
k−1
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)∑
ℓ∈S
∑nℓ
n=nℓ−1+1
∑M
k=1 (
M
k )yℓ[k]
Cn
(14)
Consequently, the capacity CPIR(C) is lower bounded by:
CPIR(C) ≥ R(C) = max
n0≤···≤nM−1∈{1,··· ,N}
R(n,C) (15)
= max
n0≤···≤nM−1∈{1,··· ,N}
∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M−1
k−1
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)∑
ℓ∈S
∑nℓ
n=nℓ−1+1
∑M
k=1 (
M
k )yℓ[k]
Cn
(16)
The proof of this lower bound is given in Section 5. We have the following remarks.
Remark 1 The upper and lower bounds for the retrieval rate are similar to the corresponding
bounds for the PIR-WTC-II problem [39] after replacing the secrecy capacity of WTC-II,
1 − µn, with the capacity of the noisy link Cn. Thus, the NPIR problem inherits all the
structural remarks of the PIR-WTC-II problem.
Remark 2 The upper and lower bounds for the retrieval rate do not depend explicitly on the
transition probabilities of the noisy channels p(yn|xn), but rather depend on the capacities of
the noisy channels Cn.
Remark 3 Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 imply that the channel coding needed for combating
channel errors is “almost seperable” from the retrieval scheme. The channel coding problem
and the retrieval problem are coupled only through agreeing on a traffic ratio vector τ . Other
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than τ , the channel coding acts as an outer code for the responses of the databases to the
user queries. Interestingly, the result implies that our schemes work even for heterogeneous
channels, e.g., if N = 2, the channel from one database can be a BSC, and the channel from
the other database can be a BEC.
Remark 4 Our results imply that randomized strategies for PIR cannot increase the retrieval
rate. We can view the noisy channel between the user and the database as a randomizer for
the actions of the databases, which is available to the databases but not available to the
user. Since the capacity expression does not depend on p(yn|xn) and is always maximized by
Cn = 1, any randomizing strategy p(yn|xn) cannot enhance the retrieval rate.
Corollary 1 (Exact capacity for M = 2 and M = 3 messages) For NPIR, the capac-
ity CPIR(C) for M = 2, 3, and an arbitrary N is given by:
CPIR(C)=


maxn0,n1∈{1,··· ,N}
n0n1∑n0
n=1
n0+1
Cn
+
∑n1
n=n0+1
n0
Cn
, M = 2
maxn0,n1,n2∈{1,··· ,N}
n0n1n2∑n0
n=1
n0n1+n0+1
Cn
+
∑n1
n=n0+1
n0n1+n0
Cn
+
∑n2
n=n1+1
n0n1
Cn
, M = 3
(17)
The proof of Corollary 1 follows from the optimality of the PIR-WTC-II scheme in [39]
for M = 2 and M = 3 messages by replacing 1− µn by Cn.
Example: The capacity for NPIR from BSC(p1), BSC(p2), N = 2, M = 3: To
show how Theorem 1 reduces to Corollary 1 for M = 3, we apply Theorem 1 to the case of
M = 3, N = 2, and the links to the user are BSC(p1), and BSC(p2). From Theorem 1, we
can write the upper bound for the achievable retrieval rate as:
R(C) ≤ max
τ∈T
min
ni∈{1,2}
∑N
n=1 τnCn +
∑N
n=n1+1
τnCn
n1
+
∑N
n=n2+1
τnCn
n1n2
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
(18)
where Cn = 1−H(pn).
By observing τ2 = 1 − τ1 and the fact that Cn is monotonically decreasing in pn for
pn ∈ (0,
1
2
) (which implies that p1 ≤ p2 satisfies C1 ≥ C2), (18) can be explicitly written as
the following linear program:
max
τ2,R
R
s.t. R ≤
1
3
(1−H(p1)) +
[
(1−H(p2))−
1
3
(1−H(p1))
]
τ2
R ≤
2
5
(1−H(p1)) +
[
4
5
(1−H(p2))−
2
5
(1−H(p1))
]
τ2
R ≤
4
7
(1−H(p1)) +
[
4
7
(1−H(p2))−
4
7
(1−H(p1))
]
τ2
0 ≤ τ2 ≤ 1 (19)
8
The bound corresponding to n1 = 2, n2 = 1 is inactive for all values of (p1, p2). Since (19)
is a linear program, its solution resides at the corner points of the feasible region. The first
corner point occurs at τ
(1)
2 = 0, which corresponds to the upper bound R ≤
1−H(p1)
3
. The
second corner point is at the intersection of the first two constraints, i.e.,
1
3
(1−H(p1)) +
[
(1−H(p2))−
1
3
(1−H(p1))
]
τ
(2)
2
=
2
5
(1−H(p1)) +
[
4
5
(1−H(p2))−
2
5
(1−H(p1))
]
τ
(2)
2 (20)
which leads to,
τ
(2)
2 =
1−H(p1)
3(1−H(p2)) + (1−H(p1))
(21)
which corresponds to the upper bound R ≤ 23
1−H(p1)
+ 1
1−H(p2)
. Similarly, by observing the
intersection between the last two constraints, we have the following upper bound R ≤
4
4
1−H(p1)
+ 3
1−H(p2)
, which is achieved at τ
(3)
2 =
3(1−H(p1))
4(1−H(p2))+3(1−H(p1))
. Consequently, an explicit
upper bound for the retrieval rate is:
R ≤ max
{
1−H(p1)
3
,
2
3
1−H(p1)
+ 1
1−H(p2)
,
4
4
1−H(p1)
+ 3
1−H(p2)
}
(22)
In Section 5.1, we will show how these rates can be achieved, hence (22) is the exact
capacity. This capacity result is illustrated in Fig. 3. The figure shows the partitioning
of the (p1, p2) (by convention p1 ≤ p2) space according to the active capacity expression.
When the ratio 2 < 1−H(p1)
1−H(p2)
≤ 3, CPIR(p1, p2) =
2
3
1−H(p1)
+ 1
1−H(p2)
. When the ratio 1−H(p1)
1−H(p2)
≤ 2,
CPIR(p1, p2) =
4
4
1−H(p1)
+ 3
1−H(p2)
, otherwise, CPIR(p1, p2) =
1−H(p1)
3
. Interestingly, Fig. 3 shows
that the dominant strategy for most (p1, p2) pairs is to rely only on database 1 for the
retrieval process. The capacity function CPIR(p1, p2) is shown in Fig. 4. The figure shows
that the maximum value for the capacity is CPIR(0, 0) =
4
7
, which is consistent with [11].
The figure also shows that CPIR(0.5, 0.5) = 0, as the answer strings become independent
of the user queries. We observe that CPIR(0, p2) =
1
3
for p2 ≥ H
−1(2
3
) = 0.1737, since the
retrieval is performed only from database 1, which is connected to the user via a noiseless
link.
Remark 5 We will show in Section 5 that channel coding and retrieval schemes for NPIR
are almost separable. Nevertheless, the final capacity expression couples the capacity of the
noisy channels and the retrieval rates from databases with noiseless links in a non-trivial way.
We illustrate the capacity expression in (22) by means of circuit theory analogy in Fig. 2.
The current from the current source represents the number of desired bits, the voltage across
the current source corresponds to the achievable retrieval rate, and the channel effect of the
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link connected to the nth database is abstracted via a parallel resistor, whose value depends
on the capacity of the channel and the total download from the nth database. Intuitively,
to maximize the retrieval rate, the user chooses one of the three circuits in Fig. 2. The
circuits are arranged ascendingly in the number of the desired bits (namely, 1, 2, 4 bits),
while the values of the resistors decrease, as the total download increases and/or due to
adding extra parallel branch. This results in a tension between conveying more desired bits
and decreasing the equivalent resistor of the circuit. The capacity-achieving scheme is the
one which maximizes the product of these contradictory effects (i.e., the voltage).
1−H(p1)
3
1
+
−
C
P
IR
(p
1
,p
2
)
(a) CPIR =
1−H(p1)
3
C
P
IR
(p
1
,p
2
)
2
1−H(p2)
+
−
1−H(p1)
3
(b) CPIR =
2
3
1−H(p1)
+ 1
1−H(p2)
1−H(p2)
3
4
+
−
C
P
IR
(p
1
,p
2
)
1−H(p1)
4
(c) CPIR =
4
4
1−H(p1)
+ 3
1−H(p2)
Figure 2: Circuit analogy for the capacity expression of PIR from BSC(p1), BSC(p2).
4 Converse Proof for NPIR
In this section, we derive a general upper bound for the NPIR problem. The main idea of
the converse hinges on the fact that the traffic from the databases should be dependent on
the relative channel qualities (i.e., channel capacities) of the response channels. Thus, we
extend the converse proof in [38] to account for the noisy observations.
We will need the following lemma, which characterizes the channel effect on the noisy
answer strings. The lemma states that the remaining uncertainty on a subset of answer
strings after revealing the queries and the message set is a sum of single-letter conditional
entropies of the noisy channels over the lengths of the answer strings. The lemma is a
consequence of the Markov chain (W1:M , Q
[m]
1:N , A˜
[m]
1:n−1)→ A
[m]
n → A˜
[m]
n .
Lemma 1 (Channel effect) For any subset S ⊆ {1, · · · , N} for all m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, the
remaining uncertainty on the noisy answer strings A˜
[m]
S given (W1:M , Q
[m]
1:N) is given by,
H(A˜
[m]
S |W1:M , Q
[m]
1:N ) =
∑
n∈S
tn∑
ηn=1
H
(
Y [m]n,ηn|X
[m]
n,ηn
)
(23)
Furthermore, (23) is true if conditioned on the complementary subset of the noisy answer
10
p1
p
2
(0, 0)
(0, 1
2
) ( 12 ,
1
2
)
1−H(p1)
3
(0, H−1( 2
3
))
(0, H−1( 1
2
))
4
4
1−H(p1)
+ 3
1−H(p2)
2
3
1−H(p1)
+ 1
1−H(p2)
Figure 3: Partitions of (p1, p2) space according to retrieval rate expression forM = 3, N = 2.
strings A˜
[m]
S¯
, i.e.,
H(A˜
[m]
S |W1:M , Q
[m]
1:N , A˜
[m]
S¯
) =
∑
n∈S
tn∑
ηn=1
H
(
Y [m]n,ηn|X
[m]
n,ηn
)
(24)
where S¯ = {1, · · · , N} \ S.
Proof: We start with the left hand side of (23),
H(A˜
[m]
S |W1:M , Q
[m]
1:N) =
∑
n∈S
H(A˜[m]n |A˜
[m]
1:n−1,W1:M , Q
[m]
1:N) (25)
(4)
=
∑
n∈S
H(A˜[m]n |A˜
[m]
1:n−1,W1:M , Q
[m]
1:N , A
[m]
n ) (26)
=
∑
n∈S
H(A˜[m]n |A
[m]
n ) (27)
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Figure 4: Capacity function CPIR(p1, p2) for M = 3, N = 2.
=
∑
n∈S
tn∑
ηn=1
H(Y [m]n,ηn|X
[m]
n,1 , · · · , X
[m]
n,tn , Yn,1, · · · , Y
[m]
n,ηn−1) (28)
(5)
=
∑
n∈S
tn∑
ηn=1
H(Y [m]n,ηn|X
[m]
n,ηn
) (29)
where (26) follows from the fact that A
[m]
n is a deterministic function of (W1:M , Q
[m]
n ), (27)
follows from the fact that (W1:M , Q
[m]
1:N , A˜
[m]
1:n−1)→ A
[m]
n → A˜
[m]
n is a Markov chain, (29) follows
from the fact that the channel is memoryless.
The proof of (24) follows similarly by observing that (W1:M , Q
[m]
1:N , A˜
[m]
1:n−1, A˜
[m]
S¯
)→ A
[m]
n →
A˜
[m]
n is a Markov chain as well. 
We need the following lemma which upper bounds the mutual information between the
noisy answer strings and the interfering messages with a linear function of the channel
capacities.
Lemma 2 (Noisy interference bound) For NPIR, the mutual information between the
interfering messages W2:M and the noisy answer strings A˜
[1]
1:N given the desired message W1
12
is upper bounded by,
I
(
W2:M ;Q
[1]
1:N , A˜
[1]
1:N |W1
)
≤
N∑
n=1
tnCn − L+ o(L) (30)
Proof: We start with the left hand side of (30),
I(W2:M ;Q
[1]
1:N ,A˜
[1]
1:N |W1)
(2)
=I
(
W2:M ;W1, Q
[1]
1:N , A˜
[1]
1:N
)
(31)
=I
(
W2:M ;Q
[1]
1:N , A˜
[1]
1:N
)
+ I
(
W2:M ;W1|Q
[1]
1:N , A˜
[1]
1:N
)
(32)
(9)
≤I
(
W2:M ;Q
[1]
1:N , A˜
[1]
1:N
)
+ o(L) (33)
(3)
=I
(
W2:M ; A˜
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N
)
+ o(L) (34)
=H
(
A˜
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N
)
−H
(
A˜
[1]
1:N |W2:M , Q
[1]
1:N
)
+ o(L) (35)
=H
(
A˜
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N
)
−H
(
A˜
[1]
1:N ,W1|W2:M , Q
[1]
1:N
)
+H
(
W1|W2:M , Q
[1]
1:N , A˜
[1]
1:N
)
+ o(L) (36)
(9)
≤H
(
A˜
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N
)
−H
(
A˜
[1]
1:N ,W1|W2:M , Q
[1]
1:N
)
+ o(L) (37)
=H
(
A˜
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N
)
−H
(
W1|W2:M , Q
[1]
1:N
)
−H
(
A˜
[1]
1:N |W1:M , Q
[1]
1:N
)
+ o(L) (38)
(23)
≤
N∑
n=1
tn∑
ηn=1
[
H
(
Y [1]n,ηn
)
−H
(
Y [1]n,ηn|X
[1]
n,ηn
)]
− L+ o(L) (39)
=
N∑
n=1
tn∑
ηn=1
I
(
X [1]n,ηn; Y
[1]
n,ηn
)
− L+ o(L) (40)
≤
N∑
n=1
tnCn − L+ o(L) (41)
where (31) follows from the independence of the messages, (33), (37) follow from the decod-
ability of W1 given (Q
[1]
1:N , A˜
[1]
1:N), (34) follows from the independence of (W2:M , Q
[1]
1:N ), (39)
follows from the independence of (W1,W2:M , Q
[1]
1:N), Lemma 1, and the fact that condition-
ing cannot increase entropy, (41) follows from the fact that I
(
X
[m]
n,ηn; Y
[m]
n,ηn
)
≤ Cn by the
definition of the nth channel capacity. 
Finally, in order to capture the recursive structure of the problem in terms of the messages
and to express the potential asymmetry of the optimal scheme, we will need the following
lemma, which inductively lower bounds the mutual information term in Lemma 2. The
lemma implies that nm−1 databases can apply a symmetric scheme when the retrieval problem
is reduced to retrieving message Wm−1 from the set of Wm−1:M messages. For the remaining
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answer strings, we directly bound them by their corresponding length of the unobserved
portion
∑N
n=nm−1+1
tnCn.
Lemma 3 (Noisy induction lemma) For allm ∈ {2, . . . ,M} and for an arbitrary nm−1 ∈
{1, · · · , N}, the mutual information term in Lemma 2 can be inductively lower bounded as,
I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m−1]
1:N , A˜
[m−1]
1:N |W1:m−1
)
≥
1
nm−1
I
(
Wm+1:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , A˜
[m]
1:N |W1:m
)
+
1
nm−1
(
L−
N∑
n=nm−1+1
tnCn
)
−
o(L)
nm−1
(42)
Proof: We start with the left hand side of (42) after multiplying by nm−1,
nm−1 I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m−1]
1:N , A˜
[m−1]
1:N |W1:m−1
)
≥ nm−1 I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m−1]
1:nm−1
, A˜
[m−1]
1:nm−1
|W1:m−1
)
(43)
≥
nm−1∑
n=1
I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m−1]
n , A˜
[m−1]
n |W1:m−1
)
(44)
(8)
=
nm−1∑
n=1
I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
n , A˜
[m]
n |W1:m−1
)
(45)
(3)
=
nm−1∑
n=1
I
(
Wm:M ; A˜
[m]
n |Q
[m]
n ,W1:m−1
)
(46)
=
nm−1∑
n=1
H
(
A˜[m]n |Q
[m]
n ,W1:m−1
)
−H
(
A˜[m]n |Q
[m]
n ,W1:M
)
(47)
≥
nm−1∑
n=1
H
(
A˜[m]n |A˜
[m]
1:n−1, Q
[m]
1:nm−1
,W1:m−1
)
−H
(
A˜[m]n |A˜
[m]
1:n−1, Q
[m]
1:nm−1
,W1:M
)
(48)
=
nm−1∑
n=1
I
(
Wm:M ; A˜
[m]
n |A˜
[m]
1:n−1, Q
[m]
1:nm−1
,W1:m−1
)
(49)
= I
(
Wm:M ; A˜
[m]
1:nm−1|Q
[m]
1:nm−1 ,W1:m−1
)
(50)
(3)
= I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
1:nm−1 , A˜
[m]
1:nm−1|W1:m−1
)
(51)
(3),(4)
= I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , A˜
[m]
1:N |W1:m−1
)
−I
(
Wm:M ; A˜
[m]
nm−1+1:N
|Q
[m]
1:N , A˜
[m]
1:nm−1
,W1:m−1
)
(52)
= I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , A˜
[m]
1:N |W1:m−1
)
−H
(
A˜
[m]
nm−1+1:N
|Q
[m]
1:N , A˜
[m]
1:nm−1 ,W1:m−1
)
+H
(
A˜
[m]
nm−1+1:N
|Q
[m]
1:N , A˜
[m]
1:nm−1
,W1:M
)
(53)
(24)
≥ I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , A˜
[m]
1:N |W1:m−1
)
−
N∑
n=nm−1+1
tn∑
ηn=1
[
H
(
Y [m]n,ηn
)
−H
(
Y [m]n,ηn |X
[m]
n,ηn
)]
(54)
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(9)
≥ I
(
Wm:M ;Wm, Q
[m]
1:N , A˜
[m]
1:N |W1:m−1
)
−
N∑
n=nm−1+1
tn∑
ηn=1
I
(
X [m]n,ηn ; Y
[m]
n,ηn
)
− o(L) (55)
= I (Wm:M ;Wm|W1:m−1) + I
(
Wm:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , A˜
[m]
1:N |W1:m
)
−
N∑
n=nm−1+1
tn∑
ηn=1
I
(
X [m]n,ηn; Y
[m]
n,ηn
)
− o(L) (56)
= I
(
Wm+1:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , A˜
[m]
1:N |W1:m
)
+
(
L−
N∑
n=nm−1+1
tn∑
ηn=1
I
(
X [m]n,ηn; Y
[m]
n,ηn
))
− o(L) (57)
≥ I
(
Wm+1:M ;Q
[m]
1:N , A˜
[m]
1:N |W1:m
)
+
(
L−
N∑
n=nm−1+1
tnCn
)
− o(L) (58)
where (43), (44) follow from the non-negativity of mutual information, (45) follows from the
privacy constraint, (46) follows from the independence of
(
Wm:M , Q
[m]
n
)
, (48) follows from the
fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy and from the fact that (W1:M , Q
[m]
1:nm−1
, A˜
[m]
1:n−1)→
(W1:M , Q
[m]
n )→ A˜
[m]
n forms a Markov chain, (51) follows from the independence of the mes-
sages and the queries, (52) follows from the chain rule, the independence of the queries and
the messages, and the fact that Q
[m]
1:N → Q
[m]
1:nm−1 → A˜
[m]
1:nm−1 forms a Markov chain by (4),
(54) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy and Lemma 1, (55) follows from
the reliability constraint, (58) follows from the definition of the channel capacity. Finally,
dividing both sides by nm−1 leads to (42). 
Now, we are ready to derive an explicit upper bound for the retrieval rate from noisy
channels. Fixing the length of the nth answer string to tn and applying Lemma 2 and
Lemma 3 successively for an arbitrary sequence {ni}
M−1
i=1 ⊂ {1, · · · , N}
M−1, we have the
following,
N∑
n=1
tnCn − L+ o˜(L)
(30)
≥ I
(
W2:M ;Q
[1]
1:N , A˜
[1]
1:N |W1
)
(59)
(42)
≥
1
n1
(
L−
N∑
n=n1+1
tnCn
)
+
1
n1
I
(
W3:M ;Q
[2]
1:N , A˜
[2]
1:N |W1:2
)
(60)
(42)
≥
1
n1
(
L−
N∑
n=n1+1
tnCn
)
+
1
n1n2
(
L−
N∑
n=n2+1
tnCn
)
+
1
n2
I
(
W4:M ;Q
[3]
1:N , A˜
[3]
1:N |W1:3
)
(61)
(42)
≥ . . .
(42)
≥
1
n1
(
L−
N∑
n=n1+1
tnCn
)
+
1
n1n2
(
L−
N∑
n=n2+1
tnCn
)
+· · ·+
1∏M−1
i=1 ni

L− N∑
n=nM−1+1
tnCn

 (62)
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where o˜(L) =
(
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
)
o(L), (59) follows from Lemma 2, and the
remaining bounding steps follow from successive application of Lemma 3.
Ordering terms, we have,
(
1 +
1
n1
+
1
n1n2
+· · ·+
1∏M−1
i=1 ni
)
L ≤
(
θ(0)+
θ(n1)
n1
+· · ·+
θ(nM−1)∏M−1
i=1 ni
)
N∑
n=1
tn+o˜(L) (63)
where θ(ℓ) =
∑N
n=ℓ+1 τnCn
We conclude the proof by taking L → ∞. Thus, for an arbitrary sequence {ni}
M−1
i=1 , we
have
R(τ ,C) =
L∑N
n=1 tn
≤
θ(0) + θ(n1)
n1
+ θ(n2)
n1n2
+ · · ·+ θ(nM−1)∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(64)
Finally, we get the tightest bound by minimizing over the sequence {ni}
M−1
i=1 over the set
{1, · · · , N}, as
R(τ ,C) ≤ min
ni∈{1,··· ,N}
θ(0) + θ(n1)
n1
+ θ(n2)
n1n2
+ · · ·+ θ(nM−1)∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(65)
= min
ni∈{1,··· ,N}
∑N
n=1 τnCn +
∑N
n=n1+1
τnCn
n1
+
∑N
n=n2+1
τnCn
n1n2
+ · · ·+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
τnCn
∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(66)
The user and the databases can agree on a traffic ratio vector τ ∈ T = {(τ1, · · · , τN ) :
τn ≥ 0 ∀n,
∑N
n=1 τn = 1} that maximizes R(τ ,C), hence the retrieval rate R(C) is upper
bounded by,
R(C) ≤ max
τ∈T
R(τ ,C) (67)
= max
τ∈T
min
ni∈{1,··· ,N}
∑N
n=1 τnCn +
∑N
n=n1+1
τnCn
n1
+
∑N
n=n2+1
τnCn
n1n2
+ · · ·+
∑N
n=nM−1+1
τnCn
∏M−1
i=1 ni
1 + 1
n1
+ 1
n1n2
+ · · ·+ 1∏M−1
i=1 ni
(68)
5 Achievability Proof for NPIR
In this section, we present the achievability proof for the NPIR problem. We show that
by means of the random coding argument, each database can independently encode its
response such that the probability of error can be made vanishingly small. The databases
use the uncoded responses as an indexing mechanism for choosing codewords from a randomly
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generated codebook. The uncoded responses, which are the truthful responses to the user
queries, vary in length to maximize the retrieval rate. The query structure builds on the
achievability proofs for PIR under asymmetric traffic constraints [38].
5.1 Motivating Example: M = 3, N = 2, via BSC(p1), BSC(p2)
We illustrate the retrieval scheme for N = 2 databases, M = 3 messages when the answer
strings pass through BSC(p1) and BSC(p2). We show that the channel coding (using linear
block codes) is almost separable from the retrieval scheme (which hinges on the result of [38]).
We begin with the case when (p1, p2) = (0.1, 0.2), then we extend this technique for all (p1, p2)
pairs. We will need the following lemma, which shows the achievability of Shannon’s channel
coding theorem for BSC using linear block codes [44, Theorem 4.17, Corollary 4.18].
Lemma 4 (Shannon’s coding theorem for BSC [44]) For BSC(p) with crossover prob-
ability p ∈ (0, 1
2
). Let n, k be integers such that R = k
n
< 1−H(p), and let EC [Pe(C)] denote
the expected probability of error Pe(C) calculated over all linear [n, k] codes C, assuming a
nearest-codeword decoder. Then,
EC[Pe(C)] < 2 · 2
−n∆(p,R) (69)
for some ∆(p, R) > 0. Moreover, for all ρ ∈ (0, 1], all but less than ρ of the linear [n, k]
codes satisfy,
Pe(C) <
2
ρ
· 2−n∆(p,R) (70)
The result implies that as long as the rate of the linear [n, k] code is strictly less than
the capacity, then there exists a linear [n, k] code with exponentially decreasing probability
of error in n with high probability.
5.1.1 Achievable Scheme for BSC(0.1), BSC(0.2)
Now, we focus on the case when (p1, p2) = (0.1, 0.2). Using the explicit upper bound in
(22), we infer that R ≤ 44
1−H(p1)
+ 3
1−H(p2)
which is 0.2183 for p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.2. To operate at
τ2 = τ
(3)
2 =
3(1−H(p1))
4(1−H(p2))+3(1−H(p1))
, we enforce the ratio between the uncoded traffic, i.e., before
channel coding, to be 4 : 3. This results in coded traffic ratio of 4
1−H(p1)
: 3
1−H(p2)
, which
appears in the denominator of the upper bound. Concurrently, this results in retrieving 4
desired bits per scheme repetition, which appears in the numerator.
To that end, the user repeats the following retrieval scheme for ν times. Each repetition
of the scheme operates over blocks of L∗ = 4 bits from all messages W1:3. The user permutes
the indices of the bits of each message independently and uniformly. Let ai(j), bi(j), ci(j)
denote the ith bit of block j from the permuted message W1, W2, W3, respectively. Assume
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without loss of generality that the desired file isW1. In block j, the user requests to download
a single bit from each message from database 1, i.e., the user requests to download a1(j),
b1(j), and c1(j) from database 1. From database 2, the user exploits the side information
generated from database 1 by requesting to download the sums a2(j) + b1(j), a3(j) + c1(j),
and b2(j) + c2(j). Finally, the user exploits the side information generated from database 1
by downloading a4(j) + b2(j) + c2(j) from database 2. The query table for the jth block is
summarized in Table 1. Denote the number of uncoded bits requested from the nth database
by Dn, then D1 = 4, D2 = 3. This guarantees that the ratio between the uncoded traffic is
4 : 3 (for any number of repetitions ν). This query structure is private, as all combinations
of the sums are included in the queries and the indices of the message bits are uniformly and
independently permuted for each block of messages (which operate on different set of bits),
the privacy constraint is satisfied.
Table 1: The query table for the jth block of M = 3, N = 2, p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.2.
Database 1 Database 2
a1(j) a2(j) + b1(j)
b1(j) a3(j) + c1(j)
c1(j) b2(j) + c2(j)
a4(j) + b2(j) + c2(j)
After receiving the queries of the user, the nth database concatenates the uncoded binary
answer strings into a vector U
[1]
n of length νDn, i.e.,
U
[1]
1 =[a1(1) b1(1) c1(1) a4(1) + b2(1) + c2(1)
· · · a1(ν) b1(ν) c1(ν) a4(ν) + b2(ν) + c2(ν)]
T (71)
U
[1]
2 =[a2(1) + b1(1) a3(1) + c1(1) b2(1) + c2(1)
· · · a2(ν) + b1(ν) a3(ν) + c1(ν) b2(ν) + c2(ν)]
T (72)
The nth database encodes the vector U
[1]
n to a coded answer string A
[1]
n of length tn using a
(tn, νDn) linear block code (which belongs to the set of good codes that satisfy (70)) such
that:
tn =
⌈
νDn
1−H(pn)
⌉
(73)
This ensures that νDn
tn
< 1 − H(pn). The nth database responds with A
[1]
n via the noisy
channel BSC(pn). The user receives the noisy answer string A˜
[1]
n from the nth database.
To perform the decoding, the user employs the nearest-codeword decoder to find an
estimate of A
[1]
n based on the observation A˜
[1]
n . Since νDntn < 1−H(pn), using Lemma 4 and
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the union bound, the probability of error in decoding is upper bounded by:
Pe(L) ≤ Pe(C1) + Pe(C2) (74)
≤
2
ρ
[
2
−t1∆
(
p1,
νD1
t1
)
+ 2
−t2∆
(
p2,
νD2
t2
)]
(75)
As ν → ∞, L → ∞ and tn → ∞, we have Pe(L) → 0. This ensures the decodability
of U
[1]
n with high probability. Since the vectors U
[1]
1 , U
[2]
2 are designed to exploit the side
information, the user can cancel the effect of the undesired messages and be left only with
the correct W1 with probability of error Pe(L). This satisfies the reliability constraint.
Finally, we calculate the achievable retrieval rate. The retrieval scheme decodes L =
νL∗ = 4ν bits from the desired messages. The retrieval scheme downloads tn =
⌈
νDn
1−H(pn)
⌉
bits from the nth database, hence as ν →∞, we have
R =
L
t1 + t2
(76)
=
νL∗
νD1
1−H(p1)
+ νD2
1−H(p2)
(77)
=
4
4
1−H(p1)
+ 3
1−H(p2)
= 0.2183 (78)
which matches the upper bound.
5.1.2 Achieving the Upper Bound for Arbitrary (p1, p2)
Now, we show that the upper bound in (22) is achievable for any (p1, p2). The idea is to
design the uncoded response vectors U
[1]
1 , U
[2]
2 such that the ratio of their traffic matches one
of the corner points of the PIR problem under asymmetric traffic constraints [38].
For R = 1−H(p1)
3
: For this rate, the user requests to download from database 1 only and
does not access database 2. Thus, the user downloads all the contents of database 1 to satisfy
the privacy constraint. Specifically, the user downloads a1(j), b1(j), c1(j) at the jth block
of the retrieval process. Database 1 encodes the responses U
[1]
1 into t1-length answer string
using (t1, νD1), where D1 = 3, and t1 =
⌈
νD1
1−H(p1)
⌉
. The user decodes ν desired symbols from
ν repetitions with vanishingly small probability of error. Consequently, R = 1−H(p1)
3
.
For R = 23
1−H(p1)
+ 1
1−H(p2)
: For this rate, the user designs the queries such that the traffic
ratio between the uncoded responses is 3 : 1. Thus, in the jth block, the user requests to
download one bit from each message, i.e., the user requests to download a1(j), b1(j), c1(j)
from database 1. The user mixes the undesired information obtained from database 1 into
one combined symbol b1(j) + c1(j) and uses this symbol as a side information in database 2
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by requesting to download a2(j) + b1(j) + c1(j). The query table for the jth block of the
scheme is depicted in Table 2.
Table 2: The query table for the jth block of M = 3, N = 2 to achieve R = 23
1−H(p1)
+ 1
1−H(p2)
Database 1 Database 2
a1(j), b1(j), c1(j) a2(j) + b1(j) + c1(j)
After repeating the retrieval process ν times, database 1 encodes the responses using
a linear (t1, νD1) =
(⌈
3ν
1−H(p1)
⌉
, 3ν
)
code, while database 2 encodes its responses using a
linear (t2, νD2) =
(⌈
ν
1−H(p2)
⌉
, ν
)
code. Using Lemma 4, the user can decode the correct W1
with vanishingly small probability of error. The user decodes L = 2ν bits from W1, hence,
as ν →∞
R =
L
t1 + t2
=
2
3
1−H(p1)
+ 1
1−H(p2)
(79)
For R = 44
1−H(p1)
+ 3
1−H(p2)
: An instance for this scheme is the (p1, p2) = (0.1, 0.2) example.
Please refer to Section 5.1.1 for the details.
Therefore, the capacity of the PIR problem from BSC(p1), BSC(p2) is given by:
CPIR(p1, p2) = max
{
1−H(p1)
3
,
2
3
1−H(p1)
+ 1
1−H(p2)
,
4
4
1−H(p1)
+ 3
1−H(p2)
}
(80)
5.2 General Achievable Scheme
In this section, we present a general achievable scheme for the NPIR problem. The main
idea of the scheme is to use the uncoded response from the nth database to user’s query
as an index for choosing the transmitted codeword from a codebook generated according to
the optimal probability distribution. The query structure maps to one of the corner points
of PIR under asymmetric traffic constraints [38] in order to maximize the retrieval rate.
Following the notations in [38], we denote the number of side information symbols that
are used simultaneously in the initial round of downloads at the nth database by sn ∈
{0, 1, · · · ,M − 1}, e.g., if sn = 1, then the user requests to download a sum of 1 desired
symbol and 1 undesired symbol as a side information in the form of a+b, a+c, ... etc., while
sn = 2 implies that the user mixes every two undesired symbols to form one side information
symbol, i.e., the user requests to download a + b + c, a + c + d, ... etc. For a given non-
decreasing sequence {ni}
M−1
i=0 ⊂ {1, · · · , N}
M , the databases are divided into groups, such
that group 0 contains database 1 through database n0, group 1 contains n1 − n0 databases
starting from database n0 + 1, and so on.
Hence, let sn = i for all ni−1 + 1 ≤ n ≤ ni with n−1 = 0 by convention. Denote
S = {i : sn = i for some n ∈ {1, · · · , N}}. We follow the round and stage definitions in [21].
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The kth round is the download queries that admit a sum of k different messages (k-sum
in [11]). A stage of the kth round is a query block of the kth round that exhausts all
(
M
k
)
combinations of the k-sum. Denote yℓ[k] to be the number of stages in round k downloaded
from the nth database, such that nℓ−1+1 ≤ n ≤ nℓ. Our scheme is repeated for ν repetitions.
Each repetition has the same query structure and operates over a block of message symbols
of length L∗. Denote the total requested symbols from the nth database in one repetition of
the scheme by Dn(n). The details of the achievable scheme are as follows:
1. Codebook construction: According to the optimal probability distribution p∗(xn) (that
maximizes the mutual information I(Xn; Yn)), the nth database constructs a
(
2νDn(n), tn(n)
)
codebook Cn at random, i.e., p(xn,1, · · · , xn,tn(n)) =
∏tn(n)
ηn=1
p∗(xn,ηn). Specifically, the
codebook Cn can be written as:
Cn =


x1(1) x2(1) · · · xtn(n)(1)
x1(2) x2(2) · · · xtn(n)(2)
...
...
...
...
x1(2
νDn(n)) x2(2
νDn(n)) · · · xtn(n)(2
νDn(n))


2νDn(n)×tn(n)
(81)
where
tn(n) =
⌈
νDn(n)
Cn
⌉
(82)
This ensures that the rate of Cn,
νDn(n)
tn(n)
< Cn to ensure reliable transmission over the
noisy channel. The nth database reveals the codebook Cn to the user.
2. Initialization at the user side: The user permutes each message independently and
uniformly using a random interleaver, i.e.,
ωm(i) = Wm(πm(i)), i ∈ {1, · · · , L} (83)
where ωm(i) is the ith symbol of the permuted Wm, πm(·) is a random interleaver for
the mth message that is chosen independently, uniformly, and privately at the user’s
side.
3. Initial download: From the nth database where 1 ≤ n ≤ n0, the user requests to
download
∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
symbols from the desired message. The user sets the round
index k = 1. I.e., the user requests the desired symbols from y0[1] =
∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
different stages.
4. Message symmetry: To satisfy the privacy constraint, for each stage initiated in the
previous step, the user completes the stage by requesting the remaining
(
M−1
k−1
)
k-sum
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combinations that do not include the desired symbols, in particular, if k = 1, the user
requests
∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
individual symbols from each undesired message.
5. Database symmetry: We divide the databases into groups. Group ℓ ∈ S corresponds
to databases nℓ−1 + 1 to nℓ. Database symmetry is applied within each group only.
Consequently, the user repeats step 2 over each group of databases, in particular, if
k = 1, the user downloads
∏
s∈S
(
M−2
s−1
)
individual symbols from each message from the
first n0 databases (group 1).
6. Exploitation of side information: The undesired symbols downloaded within the kth
round (the k-sums that do not include the desired message) are used as side information
in the (k+1)th round. This exploitation of side information is performed by requesting
to download (k + 1)-sum consisting of 1 desired symbol and a k-sum of undesired
symbols only that were generated in the kth round. Note that for the nth database,
if sn > k, then this database does not exploit the side information generated in the
kth round. Consequently, the nth database belonging to the ℓth group exploits the
side information generated in the kth round from all databases except itself if sn ≤
k. Moreover, for sn = k, extra side information can be used in the nth database.
This is due to the fact that the user can form n0
∏
s∈S\{sn}
(
M−2
s−1
)
extra stages of side
information by constructing k-sums of the undesired symbols in round 1 from the
databases in group 0.
7. Repeat steps 4, 5, 6 after setting k = k + 1 until k = M .
8. Repetition of the scheme: Repeat steps 3, · · · , 7 for a total of ν repetitions.
9. Shuffling the order of the queries: By shuffling the order of the queries uniformly,
all possible queries can be made equally likely regardless of the message index. This
guarantees the privacy.
10. Encoding the responses to the user’s queries: The nth database responds to the user
queries truthfully. The nth database concatenates all the responses to the user’s queries
in a vector U
[i]
n of length νDn(n). The nth database uses U
[i]
n as an index for choosing a
codeword from Cn, i.e., the index of the codeword and U
[i]
n should be in bijection (e.g.,
by transforming U
[i]
n into a decimal value). Consequently, the nth database responds
with,
A[i]n = [x1(U
[i]
n ) x1(U
[i]
n ) · · · xtn(n)(U
[i]
n )]
T (84)
5.3 Privacy, Reliability, and Achievable Rate
Privacy: The privacy of the scheme follows from the privacy of the inherent PIR scheme
under asymmetric traffic constraints. Specifically, for every stage of the kth round initiated,
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all
(
M
k
)
combinations of the k-sum are included at each round. Thus, the structure of the
queries is the same for any desired message at any repetition of the achievable scheme. Due
to the random and independent permutation of each message and the random shuffling of
the order of the queries, all queries are equally likely independent of the desired message
index, and thus the privacy constraint in (8) is guaranteed.
Reliability: The user employs joint typicality decoder for every noisy answer string A˜
[i]
n to
decode the codeword index. From the channel coding theorem [45, Theorem 7.7.1], for every
rate νDn(n)
tn(n)
< Cn, there exists a sequence of (2
νDn(n), tn(n)) with maximum probability of
error Pe(Cn) → 0 as tn(n) → ∞. By letting ν → ∞, we have tn(n) → ∞,
νDn(n)
tn(n)
< Cn and
hence we ensure the existence of a good code such that Pe(Cn) → 0. By union bound, the
probability of error in decoding the indices of the codewords from every database is upper
bounded by Pe ≤
∑N
n=1 Pe(Cn)→ 0.
Since the index of the codeword is bijective to U
[i]
n , the probability of error in decoding
U
[i]
n for n = 1, · · · , N is vanishingly small. Now, by construction of the queries as in [38],
all side information symbols used in the (k + 1)th round are decodable in the kth round or
from round 1, the user cancels out these side information and is left with symbols from the
desired message. Consequently, there is no error in the decoding given that U
[i]
n is correct
for every n.
Achievable Rate: The structure of one repetition of our scheme is exactly as [38]. The
recursive structure is described using the following system of difference equations that relate
the number of stages in the databases belonging to a specific group as shown in [38, Theo-
rem 2]:
y0[k] = (n0−1)y0[k−1] +
∑
j∈S\{0}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1]
y1[k] = (n1−n0−1)y1[k−1] +
∑
j∈S\{1}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1]
yℓ[k] = n0ξℓδ[k−ℓ−1] + (nℓ−nℓ−1−1)yℓ[k − 1] +
∑
j∈S\{ℓ}
(nj−nj−1)yj[k−1], ℓ ≥ 2 (85)
where yℓ[k] is the number of stages in the kth round in a database belonging to the ℓth
group, i.e., for the nth database, such that nℓ−1 + 1 ≤ n ≤ nℓ.
To calculate Dn(n) where nℓ−1 ≤ n ≤ nℓ, we note that for any stage in the kth round,
the user downloads
(
M−1
k−1
)
desired symbols from a total of
(
M
k
)
downloads. Therefore,
Dn(n) =
M∑
k=1
(
M
k
)
yℓ[k], nℓ−1 ≤ n ≤ nℓ (86)
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Thus, the total download
∑N
n=1 tn(n) from all databases from all repetitions is calculated
by observing (82) and ignoring the ceiling operator as ν →∞,
N∑
n=1
tn(n) =
N∑
n=1
νDn(n)
Cn
(87)
= ν
[
n0∑
n=1
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
y0[k]
Cn
+
n1∑
n=n0+1
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
y1[k]
Cn
+ · · ·
]
(88)
= ν
∑
ℓ∈S
nℓ∑
n=nℓ−1+1
∑M
k=1
(
M
k
)
yℓ[k]
Cn
(89)
Furthermore, the total desired symbols from all databases from all repetitions is given by,
L(n) = ν
∑
ℓ∈S
M∑
k=1
(
M − 1
k − 1
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1) (90)
Consequently, the following rate is achievable corresponding to the sequence n,
R(n,C) =
∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M−1
k−1
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)∑
ℓ∈S
∑nℓ
n=nℓ−1+1
∑M
k=1 (
M
k )yℓ[k]
Cn
(91)
Since this scheme is achievable for every monotone non-decreasing sequence n = {ni}
M−1
i=0 ,
the following rate is achievable,
R(C) = max
n0≤···≤nM−1∈{1,··· ,N}
∑
ℓ∈S
∑M
k=1
(
M−1
k−1
)
yℓ[k](nℓ − nℓ−1)∑
ℓ∈S
∑nℓ
n=nℓ−1+1
∑M
k=1 (
M
k )yℓ[k]
Cn
(92)
6 PIR from Multiple Access Channel
In this section, we consider the MAC-PIR problem. This problem is an extension of the NPIR
model presented in Section 2 which consists of N non-colluding and replicated databases
storing M messages. In MAC-PIR (see Fig. 5), the user sends a query Q
[i]
n for the nth
database to retrieve Wi privately and correctly. The nth database responds with an answer
string A
[i]
n = (X
[i]
n,1, · · · , X
[i]
n,t). The user receives a noisy observation A˜
[i]
n = (Y
[i]
1 , · · · , Y
[i]
t ),
where the responses of the databases (A
[i]
1 , A
[i]
2 , · · · , A
[i]
N) pass through a discrete memoryless
channel with a transition probability distribution p(y|x1, · · · , xN ), i.e.,
P
(
A˜[i]|A
[i]
1 , A
[i]
2 , · · · , A
[i]
N
)
=
t∏
η=1
p
(
y[i]η |x
[i]
1,η, x
[i]
2,η, · · · , x
[i]
N,η
)
(93)
In this sense, the retrieval is performed via a cooperative multiple access channel, as
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[i]
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A
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[i]
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[i]
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.
Figure 5: The MAC-PIR problem.
the databases cooperate to convey the message Wi to a common receiver (the user). The
full cooperation is realized via the user queries. Furthermore, in MAC-PIR, the database
responses are mixed together to have the noisy observation A˜[i] in contrast to the noisy PIR
problem with orthogonal links presented in Section 2.
In MAC-PIR, the user should be able to reconstructWi with vanishingly small probability
of error by observing the noisy and mixed output A˜[i], i.e., the reliability constraint is written
as:
H(Wi|Q
[i]
1:N , A˜
[i]) ≤ o(L) (94)
and the privacy constraint is written as:
(Q[i]n , A
[i]
n ,W1:M) ∼ (Q
[j]
n , A
[j]
n ,W1:M), ∀i, j ∈ {1, · · · ,M} (95)
We observe that the main difference between (95) and (8) is that we cannot claim that
A˜[i] ∼ A˜[j] in the MAC-PIR problem. This is due to the fact that the user cannot statistically
differentiate between the responses corresponding to each message and hence the user cannot
decode the desired message. This is in contrast to the NPIR problem with orthogonal links,
where A˜[i] ∼ A˜[j] due to the Markov chain (W1:M , Q
[i]
n )→ A
[i]
n → A˜
[i]
n .
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The retrieval rate for the MAC-PIR is given by:
R =
L
t
(96)
and the MAC-PIR capacity is CPIR = supR over all retrieval schemes. We note that, without
loss of generality, we can assume that all responses from the databases have the same length
t in contrast to the NPIR problem with orthogonal links. The reason is that the retrieval
rate depends only on the output of the channel and not on the individual responses of the
databases. Hence, even if the database responses are different in lengths, we can choose
t = maxn∈[N ] tn by appending the remaining responses by dummy symbols.
In the sequel, we discuss the issue of separability of channel coding and the information
retrieval in MAC-PIR via some examples. Interestingly, we show that the optimal PIR
scheme for the additive MAC and logic conjunction/disjunction MAC, the channel coding
and the retrieval scheme are dependent on the channel transition probability, and hence
channel coding and retrieval procedure are inseparable.
6.1 Additive MAC
In the first special case, we consider the additive MAC. In the additive MAC, at each time
instant η, the responses of the databases are added together (in modulo-2) in addition to a
random variable Zη ∼ Bernoulli(p), which is independent of (W1:M , Q
[i]
1:N) and corresponds
to a random additive noise, i.e.,
Yη =
N∑
n=1
Xn,η + Zη (97)
The following theorem characterizes the capacity of the MAC-PIR problem if the channel
is restricted to additive MACs.
Theorem 3 The additive MAC-PIR capacity is,
CPIR = 1−H(p) (98)
where p ∈ [0, 0.5) is the flipping probability of the additive noise.
We have the following remarks.
Remark 6 For noiseless additive MAC, i.e., p = 0 and Yη =
∑N
n=1Xn,η, the MAC-PIR
capacity is CPIR = 1. This implies that there is no penalty due to the privacy constraint,
i.e., the user can have privacy for free. Interestingly, this is the first instance where the PIR
capacity is independent of the number of databases N and the number of messages M .
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Remark 7 For noiseless additive MAC, i.e., p = 0, separation between channel coding and
retrieval process is not optimal unlike the NPIR problem with orthogonal links. In fact, the
retrieval scheme is dependent on the structure of the channel. To see this, the user generates
a random binary vector h = [h1 h2 · · · hM ] ∈ {0, 1}
M . The user sends h to database 1, flips
the ith position of h and sends it to database 2, and does not send anything to the remaining
databases. Thus, the responses of the databases are,
A
[i]
1 =
M∑
m=1
hmWm (99)
A
[i]
2 =
M∑
m=1
hmWm +Wi (100)
This is exactly the retrieval scheme in [1]. Since the channel is additive and noiseless,
A˜[i] = A
[i]
1 + A
[i]
2 = Wi. Hence, the user downloads 1 bit from the channel in order to get 1
bit from the desired file and R = 1. Here, we note that, the channel performs the processing
at the user for free. This implies that by careful design of queries, the user can exploit the
channel in its favor to maximize the retrieval rate.
Proof: We prove the converse and achievability.
The converse proof: To show the converse, we assume that W1 is the desired message
without loss of generality. Then, we have the following implications,
L = H(W1) (101)
(2),(3)
= H(W1|W2:M , Q
[1]
1:N) (102)
(94)
≤ H(W1|W2:M , Q
[1]
1:N)−H(W1|W2:M , Q
[1]
1:N , A˜
[1]) + o(L) (103)
= I(W1; A˜
[1]|Q
[1]
1:N ,W2:M) + o(L) (104)
= H(A˜[1]|Q
[1]
1:N ,W2:M)−H(A˜
[1]|Q
[1]
1:N ,W1:M) + o(L) (105)
(4)
≤ H(A˜[1])−H(A˜[1]|Q
[1]
1:N ,W1:M , A
[1]
1:N) + o(L) (106)
= t−H(A˜[1]|A
[1]
1:N) + o(L) (107)
= t−
t∑
η=1
H(Y [1]η |X
[1]
1,η, X
[1]
2,η, · · · , X
[1]
N,η) + o(L) (108)
= t−
t∑
η=1
H
(
N∑
n=1
X [1]n,η + Zη|X
[1]
1,η, X
[1]
2,η, · · · , X
[1]
N,η
)
+ o(L) (109)
= t−
t∑
η=1
H(Zη|X
[1]
1,η, X
[1]
2,η, · · · , X
[1]
N,η) + o(L) (110)
= t(1−H(p)) + o(L) (111)
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where (102) follows from the independence of the messages and the queries, (103) follows
from the reliability constraint, (106) follows from the fact that the answer string A
[1]
n is
a deterministic function of the messages and the queries, (107) follows from the fact that
(W1:M , Q
[1]
1:N)→ A
[1]
1:N → A˜
[1] is a Markov chain, (108) follows from the fact that the channel
is memoryless, and (111) follows from the independence of Zη and (X
[1]
1,η, X
[1]
2,η, · · · , X
[1]
N,η) as
a consequence of the independence of (Zη,W1:M , Q
[1]
1:N).
Hence, by reordering terms and taking L→∞, we have R = L
t
≤ 1−H(p). Note that we
can interpret the upper bound as the cooperative MAC bound, i.e., R ≤ I(Y ;X1, X2, · · · , XN) =
1−H(p).
The achievability proof: To show the general achievability, the user submits queries to
database 1 and database 2 only and ignores the remaining databases. We note that the
additive MAC in this case boils down to Yη = X1,η + X2,η + Zη, which means that the
channel p(y|x1, x2) is BSC(p). Consequently, we use again Shannon’s coding theorem for
BSC in Lemma 4.
To that end, let the mth message be a vector Wm = [Wm(1) Wm(2) · · · Wm(L)]
of length L. The user repeats the following scheme L times. For the jth repetition of the
scheme, the user generates a random binary vector h(j) = [h1(j) h2(j) · · · hM(j)] ∈
{0, 1}M . The user sends the following queries to the databases:
Q
[i]
1 (j) = h(j) (112)
Q
[i]
2 (j) = h(j) + ei (113)
where ei is the unit vector containing 1 only at the ith position. The queries are private
since Q
[i]
n is a vector picked uniformly from {0, 1}M for any message i.
For the jth repetition of the scheme, the database uses the received query vector as a
combining vector for the jth element of all messages. The nth database concatenates all
responses in a vector U
[i]
n of length L, hence
U
[i]
1 =
[
M∑
m=1
hm(1)Wm(1)
M∑
m=1
hm(2)Wm(2) · · ·
M∑
m=1
hm(L)Wm(L)
]
(114)
U
[i]
2 =
[
M∑
m=1
hm(1)Wm(1) +Wi(1)
M∑
m=1
hm(2)Wm(2) +Wi(2)
· · ·
M∑
m=1
hm(L)Wm(L) +Wi(L)
]
(115)
From Lemma 4, for p ∈ (0, 0.5), all but ρ linear [t, L] block codes C, where L
t
= R <
1 − H(p) that have Pe(C) <
2
ρ
· 2−t∆(p,R). Then, the databases agree on the same [t, L]
code from the family of good codes, where t = L
⌊1−H(p)⌋
. The nth database encodes U
[i]
n
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independently by the same [t, L] linear block code to output A
[i]
n .
After passing through the noisy channel, the noisy observation is given by:
A˜[i] = A
[i]
1 + A
[i]
2 + Z1:t (116)
= Aˆ[i] + Z1:t (117)
Since the two databases employ the same linear block code, the sum of the two codewords
Aˆ[i] = A
[i]
1 + A
[i]
2 is also a valid codeword corresponding to the sum U
[i]
1 + U
[i]
2 .
Consequently, as L→∞, t→∞, the probability of error in decoding the sum U
[i]
1 +U
[i]
2
is Pe(L)→ 0. By observing that U
[i]
1 + U
[i]
2 = Wi, the reliability proof follows. 
Remark 8 In the achievability proof, the PIR scheme relies on the additivity of the channel.
In particular, the scheme uses a linear block code to exploit the fact that the sum of two code-
words from a linear block code is also a valid codeword. Consequently, the retrieval process
depends on the channel transition probability explicitly as opposed to the NPIR problem with
orthogonal links.
6.2 Logic Conjunction/Disjunction MACs
In this section, we show that we can achieve privacy for free for MACs other than the additive
MACs. We illustrate this result by considering the MAC-PIR problem through channels that
output the logical conjunctions (logic AND)/disjunctions (logic OR) of the inputs. Let ∧
denote the logical conjunction operator, ∨ denote the logical disjunction operator, and ¬
denote the logical negation operator. The input-output relation of the discrete memoryless
logical conjunction channel is given as:
Yη =
N∧
n=1
Xn,η (118)
For the logical conjunction channel, we have the following capacity result.
Theorem 4 In the logical conjunction MAC-PIR problem, if N ≥ 2M−1, then the MAC-PIR
capacity is CPIR = 1, where M is the number of messages.
We have the following observations:
Remark 9 Similar to the additive MAC, there is no loss due to the privacy constraint for
the conjunction MAC. In this case, the capacity depends on the number of messages M , and
the number of databases N unlike the additive MAC. Interestingly, the result shows the first
instance of a threshold for the number of databases at which the full unconstrained capacity
can be achieved N = 2M−1, which is dependent on the number of messages M .
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Remark 10 We note that the minimum number of databases N that results in CPIR = 1 is
still an open problem. In fact, the capacity for N < 2M−1 is also an interesting open problem.
Proof: It suffices to show only the achievability for this problem as the retrieval rate is
trivially upper bounded by 1. To that end, the user submits queries to 2M−1 databases
and submits nothing to the remaining databases. The user generates the random variables
(Z1, · · · , ZM) independently, privately, and uniformly from {0, 1}. The random variable
Zm ∼ Bernoulli(
1
2
) is a Bernoulli random variable that represents the negation state of the
mth message literal in the first query Q
[i]
1 , i.e., if Zm = 1, this means that the user requests
Wm in Q
[i]
1 , while Zm = 0 means that the user requests ¬Wm in Q
[i]
1 . Let W˜m be the requested
literal from the mth message in Q
[i]
1 , hence,
W˜m =
{
Wm, Zm = 1
¬Wm, Zm = 0
(119)
Now, without loss of generality, assume thatW1 is the desired message. From database 1,
the user requests to download the disjunction X1 =
∨M
m=1 W˜m. From every other database,
the user requests the same literal W˜1 with a new disjunction of the remaining messages with
different negation pattern than what is requested from database 1. I.e., from database 2, the
user requests the disjunction X2 = W˜1 ∨¬W˜2 ∨
∨
m∈[M ]\{1,2} W˜m. From database 3, the user
requests the disjunction X3 = W˜1 ∨¬W˜3 ∨
∨
m∈[M ]\{1,3} W˜m, · · · etc. Denote the disjunction
of messages W2:M requested from the nth database by Fn, where n ∈ {1, · · · , 2
M−1}, then
the received observation at the user is
Y =
(
M∨
m=1
W˜m
)
∧

W˜1 ∨ ¬W˜2 ∨ ∨
m∈[M ]\{1,2}
W˜m

 ∧

W˜1 ∨ ¬W˜3 ∨ ∨
m∈[M ]\{1,3}
W˜m

 ∧ · · · (120)
= W˜1 ∨
2M−1∧
i=1
Fi (121)
= W˜1 (122)
where (121) follows from successively applying the Boolean relation (W˜1∨G1)∧ (W˜1∨G2) =
W˜1∨(G1∧G2) for any logical expressions G1, G2. (122) follows from the fact that there exist
2M−1 different negation states for the literals fromW2:M , each negation state is requested from
one database in the form of logical expression Fi, hence the conjunction of all these logical
expressions
∧2M−1
i=1 Fi = 0 as all possible product of sums of W2:M exist in the conjunction.
This satisfies the reliability constraint. Another way to see this result is that the queries are
designed such that they cover exactly half the M-dimensional Karnaugh map, which can be
reduced to either W1 or ¬W1.
Furthermore, since the negation state for every message is chosen uniformly, indepen-
dently, and uniformly for each message, the probability of receiving specific query from the
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user is 1
2M
irrespective to the desired message, which guarantees the privacy. 
Illustrative example: M = 3 messages, N = 4 databases with conjunction channel:
As an explicit example, let M = 3, N = 2M−1 = 4, then the user requests the following:
X1 = W˜1 ∨ W˜2 ∨ W˜3 (123)
X2 = W˜1 ∨ ¬W˜2 ∨ W˜3 (124)
X3 = W˜1 ∨ W˜2 ∨ ¬W˜3 (125)
X4 = W˜1 ∨ ¬W˜2 ∨ ¬W˜3 (126)
Hence, the output of the channel is,
Y = X1 ∧X2 ∧X3 ∧X4 (127)
= (W˜1 ∨ W˜2 ∨ W˜3) ∧ (W˜1 ∨ ¬W˜2 ∨ W˜3) ∧ (W˜1 ∨ W˜2 ∨ ¬W˜3) ∧ (W˜1 ∨ ¬W˜2 ∨ ¬W˜3) (128)
= (W˜1 ∨ (W˜2 ∨ W˜3) ∧ (¬W˜2 ∨ W˜3)) ∧ (W˜1 ∨ (W˜2 ∨ ¬W˜3) ∧ (¬W˜2 ∨ ¬W˜3)) (129)
= (W˜1 ∨W3) ∧ (W˜1 ∨ ¬W˜3) (130)
= W˜1 (131)
Thus, the user can decode W1 from Y as the user knows the correct negation pattern for
W˜1 privately. The scheme is private as all queries are equally likely with probability
1
8
irrespective to the desired message. Since the user downloads 1 bit to retrieve 1 bit from the
desired message, the retrieval rate R = 1.
Remark 11 We note that the result is still valid if the channel is replaced by a disjunction
channel, i.e.,
Yη =
N∨
n=1
Xn,η (132)
In this case, the user submits the same queries for the databases with replacing every disjunc-
tion operator with a conjunction operator. The proof of reliability follows from the duality of
the product-of-sum and the sum-of-product.
Remark 12 The achievable scheme for the conjunction channel is a non-linear retrieval
scheme that depends on the non-linear characteristics of the channel in contrast to the linear
retrieval scheme used for the additive channel. This confirms the non-separability between
the retrieval scheme and the channel coding needed for reliable communication through the
channel.
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6.3 Selection Channel
In this example, we illustrate the fact that the privacy for free phenomenon may not be
always feasible for any arbitrary channel in the MAC-PIR problem. To illustrate this, we
consider the selection channel. In this channel, the user selects to connect to one database
only at random and sticks to it throughout the transmission, i.e.,
Yη = Xn,η, n ∼ uniform {1, · · · , N} (133)
In this channel, the user is connected to the same database at every channel use. This
implies that the user faces a single-database (N = 1) PIR problem at every channel use.
The optimal PIR strategy for N = 1 is to download all the messages (M messages) from the
connected database. Thus, the PIR capacity is given by CPIR =
1
M
.
It is worth noting that there is another slight variant of the selection channel, in which
the user selects to connect to one database at random at every channel use, i.e.,
Yη = Xn(η),η, n(η) ∼ uniform {1, · · · , N} (134)
where n(η) corresponds to the database index at channel use η. Then, CPIR ≤ C = (1+
1
N
+
· · ·+ 1
NM−1
)−1 trivially as the capacity of the classical PIR C [11], in which all the databases
are connected to the user, is an upper bound for this problem, as the user can choose to ignore
all the responses except the ones in the classical PIR problem. For the achievability, the user
can repeat the achievable scheme in [11] ν times, which results in using the selection channel
t = ν L
C
= νN(N
M−1)
N−1
. At channel use η, the user chooses a new query element from Q
[i]
n(η) and
submits it to database n(η). As ν →∞, by strong law of large numbers, each database will
be visited tn times, where tn →
t
N
in the limit for every n. Hence, all bits are decodable by
the decodability of the scheme in [11] and CPIR = C = (1 +
1
N
+ · · ·+ 1
NM−1
)−1 < 1 as well.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced noisy PIR with orthogonal links (NPIR), and PIR from multiple
access channels (MAC-PIR). We focused on the issue of the separability of the channel
coding and the retrieval scheme. For the NPIR problem, we proved that the channel coding
and the retrieval scheme are almost separable in the sense that every database implements
its own channel coding independently from other databases. The problem is coupled only
through agreeing on a suitable traffic ratio vector to maximize the retrieval rate. On the
other hand, these conclusions are not valid for the MAC-PIR problem. We showed two
examples, namely: PIR from additive MAC and PIR from logical conjunction/disjunction
MAC. In these examples, we showed that the channel coding and retrieval schemes are indeed
inseparable unlike in the NPIR problem. In both cases, we showed that by careful design
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of joint retrieval and coding schemes, we can attain the full capacity CPIR = 1 −H(p) and
CPIR = 1, respectively, with no loss due to the privacy constraint.
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